Introduction
Performance assessment has always been a vital part of academia. Knowledge is perceived as sound for as long as it can withstand the critical evaluation of peers. For a long time, there was no direct link between research performance assessment and the distribution of resources. The governing bodies in higher education distributed funds more or less equally and left the performance assessment to a decentralized community of peers. However, in the 1980s, there was a focus in higher education governance on performance-oriented research output rather than financial input, increasingly stimulating research with centralized instruments and orienting assessment partially on non-academic standards like societal impact (Braun and Merrien, 1999; Paradeise et al., 2009) . New instruments of systematic research performance assessment were installed at the interface between academia, the state, and the market. The assessment instruments now guide a selective allocation of scarce resources to what are supposed to be the best performers, thus rewarding "research elites" (Slaughter and Leslie, 1999; Münch, 2014) .
Drawing on data that I have examined elsewhere to address related questions , the current contribution asks whether the production of research elites produces unintended stratification effects. The case study is the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE)/Research Excellence Framework (REF) , an instrument of research performance assessment in the United Kingdom (UK). After discussing consequences of research performance assessments, particular attention is drawn to whether stratification is actually a consequence intended by the RAE/REF. Building on data from the three most recent assessments , RAE 2008 , REF 2014 , the unequal distribution of symbolic, social, and economic resources in the discipline of history is examined in a field and capital theoretical framework. This distribution is correlated to RAE/REF rank groups. The closing discussion interprets the stratification of the field and its consecration by RAE/REF rank groups. The contribution concludes that the elite (re-)produced by research performance assessments in the UK is not (solely) based on "excellence," but on previous allocations of resources.
Their high degree of simplification -or, in other terms, their ability to reduce complexity -may contribute to the efficacy and potency of the assessments (see also Werron, 2014; Hamann, 2017) . More crucial, however, is that the RAE/REF produce distinctions that are not merely symbolic and thus blurry enough to be contested, reinterpreted, or ignored. The assessments are so powerful because the symbolic distinctions they make are linked to the (re-)production of material classes (cf. Maeße, 2016) . Since the RAE/REF results inform the allocation of funds by the UK funding councils, the entire basic research funding of institutions and, ultimately, research fields is at stake. The most recent REF 2014, for example, informed the distribution of £1.6 billion annually for the subsequent six years. From a sum of almost £10 billion, the departments rewarded with the best grade (4*) receive 80 percent, those with the second best grade (3*) receive 20 percent. The departments below those grades receive no public basic research funding at all (HEFCE, 2015) .
While the main aim of the RAE/REF has always been to assess the research quality of departments and thereby inform the distribution of public funds, the assessments have evolved significantly since they started in 1986. In the space of 30 years, the RAE/REF have become increasingly sophisticated, advancing the criteria, their calculation, and compilation (Bence and Oppenheim, 2005) . The RAE 2001, for example, was characterized above all by grade inflation, which led to a more concentrated funding policy. The main change in the RAE 2008 was the introduction of research profiles for each department based on the proportion of publications that met respective quality standards. In the RAE 2001 and 2008, the submissions included data on staff, research output, and the research environment, for example, research income and doctoral degrees awarded. The most important new feature of the REF 2014 is that this data has been expanded to include information that is intended to document the societal impact of research. Thus the former two pillars of research assessment, research "output quality" and "research environment," have been complemented by "impact" (weighted with 65, 15, and 20 percent respectively) (REF, 2011 ).
Regardless of their development over time, the underlying principle behind the assessments is straightforward: "Institutions conducting the best research receive a larger proportion of the available grant so that the infrastructure for the top level of research in the UK is protected and developed." (RAE, 2001e ).
The following section will consider the effects of a policy that sets out to "protect" the "best research".
Consequences of research performance assessments
The literature on performance assessments in general and the RAE/REF in particular suggests that they have several effects. One finding is that instruments of higher education governance may influence the development of disciplines by dictating the criteria used in peer review (Hicks, 2012) . In the RAE/REF, assessments are conducted by experts from the research fields, but in order to ensure fairness across disciplinary fields, the experts must adhere to common criteria that are defined by the funding councils (Tapper and Salter, 2003) . Although defined by the funding councils, the criteria are grounded in expert advicewhich can have a reinforcing effect in itself (cf. Martin and Whitley, 2010) . Disclosing such wide-ranging assessment criteria has standardizing effects on research. Overall, researchers' choices of publication topics (Talib, 2001 ) and publication patterns (Moed, 2008) seem to have changed under the influence of the RAE/REF. In economics, heterodox approaches have fallen victim to orthodox assessment panels, criteria geared toward mainstream journals, and a general orientation toward "excellence" (Lee et al., 2013; Maeße, 2016) . In life sciences, academics have shifted their research practices in order to cooperate with an intrusive policy regime (Morris and Rip, 2006) . In law departments, academic work is increasingly concentrating on placing articles in a small number of highly ranked journals (Campbell et al., 1999) .
Studies have also revealed that status assignments create new layers of dependency and authority, for example between funding institutions and universities (Salter and Tapper, 2002) , between university management and the departments they intervene in (Henkel, 1999) , between panel members and the colleagues whose research they are judging (Sharp and Coleman, 2005) , and between research active personnel and the colleagues who are required to take over their teaching duties (Salter and Tapper, 2002) .
The literature has further identified increased stratification as an effect of research performance assessment. On the general level of universities, the RAE/REF is seen as a mechanism of status allocation and resource concentration (Henkel, 1999 ) that manifests, for example, a bias against new universities and in favor of traditional universities (Tapper and Salter, 2003) . In chemistry, research grants and highly cited scientists are concentrated in just a few institutions (Münch and Schäfer, 2014) . Economics, a rather stratified discipline even before performance assessments were applied, is even more dominated by a select group of prestigious elite departments that receive the major share of funding (Lee et al., 2013; Maeße, 2015) . In the humanities in general, the RAE/REF is assumed to have led to a concentration of research activities in certain institutions (Kehm and Leišytė, 2010; . In all cases, the accumulation of capital can be interpreted as a result of the intensified struggle for resources in an increasingly stratified system consolidated by the RAE/REF.
This study contributes a longitudinal perspective to the literature. It reveals that the RAE/REF (re-)produce and consecrate a disciplinary center-periphery structure that is not oriented toward research "excellence" (alone) but follows previous allocations of resources. This argument will be developed taking the discipline of history as a case study. The currencies that are valued most highly on the newly established These are proofs of the final publication available at Springer International Publishing: http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319539690 quasi-markets -journal articles and research with societal impact (Moed, 2008; Martin, 2011) -have less weight in a discipline which still perceives research and teaching as a unit, traditionally focuses on monographs and edited volumes rather than journal articles, and attaches more weight to basic rather than applied research (Kehm and Leišytė, 2010; Zuccala et al., 2014) . A longitudinal examination of the production of elites in the discipline of history thus makes it possible to see the effects a highly developed system of performance assessment has on a discipline with very different research and publication cultures. The empirical evidence revealed for history may not be as distinct in disciplines that link teaching and research less closely, have a proclivity for incremental research within an established paradigm, and are used to quantify performance measures in the form of impact indices.
The (dys)functionality of stratification
With present research already indicating effects of stratification, this contribution must address one aspect in particular: it is the declared aim of the RAE/REF not only to "identify excellence," but also to protect and develop a "research elite" by granting the corresponding institutions the largest proportion of funding (RAE, 2001e; REF, 2012) . It is thus a vital part of the mission behind the assessment to indeed create a stratified academic landscape. The question is therefore to what extent the effects of stratification discussed here might actually be intentional.
The position of the RAE/REF on stratification can best be described in terms of traditional structural functionalist perspectives. Here, the hierarchical structuration of social entities appears to be functional for the establishment of social order (Davis and Moore, 1944) . Positions at the top of social hierarchies are occupied by a performance elite that is evaluated according to unambiguous, universal, meritocratic criteria, and rewarded appropriately. This is exactly how the RAE/REF is supposed to operate. Authors that have applied a functionalist outlook on science (Cole and Cole, 1973; Merton, 1973b) have emphasized that the functionality of stratification relies on at least two conditions: the performance assessments that justify stratification should not be influenced by the assessment procedures themselves (reliability); and the assessment indicators should be able to actually measure what is supposed to be measured (validity) , that is, they should indeed be able to identify "research performance" in the complex reality of the academic world. Regardless of whether the hierarchical structuration of academia -or any other social order for that matter -is actually considered desirable, the corresponding performance assessment instruments must be reliable and valid. research performance (alone), but the ability of researchers and departments to adapt to the metrics of the assessments (Talib, 2001; Hare, 2003) . In addition to what is referred to as the reactivity of rankings (Espeland and Sauder, 2007) , scholars have also questioned whether performance indicators exist that permit valid measurement of research quality at all, let alone capture the broad range of academic performance beyond it (Laudel, 2005; Blockmans et al., 2014) . Valid research performance indicators are especially difficult to imagine for disciplines in the social sciences and humanities, where highly differentiated publication practices, schools and communities are even more prominent and research is thus standardized to an even lesser degree (Archambault et al., 2006; Angermüller, 2010) .
Given these serious problems regarding the validity and reliability of research performance assessments, the current contribution does not intend to promote a better approach to identifying "excellence"
or demonstrate how research performance should actually be measured. Picking up on studies that illustrate the general complexity and situational embeddedness of notions such as "research quality" (Lamont, 2009; Hirschauer, 2010) , any notion of "good," let alone "excellent," research must be far too vague and slippery to develop and operationalize a definition in assessment instruments. What can be examined, however, is the assessment instruments themselves and their effects on research infrastructures.
In light of the significant doubts regarding a structural functionalist interpretation of stratification in academia, it seems worthwhile to consider alternative approaches. The current contribution will draw on a Bourdieusian (1988) heuristic of field and capital theory. Equipped with this heuristic, the analysis in this paper is sensitized for the construction of status hierarchies alongside the structurally unequal distribution of resources. Attempts to identify research elites then (re-)produce a relatively stable center-periphery structure in the academic landscape, rewarding social, symbolic, and economic capital rather than "excellence" alone (Burris, 2004; Weakliem et al., 2012; Münch and Schäfer, 2014) . The analysis will pursue this perspective for the RAE/REF in the discipline of history.
Data
The investigation is based on data for history in the UK according to the three most recent assessments , RAE 2008 , REF 2014 . In order to reveal longitudinal stratification effects, four rank groups, two The "top 6" and "top 14" represent research elites attributed with a strong research output, the "bottom 6" and "bottom 14" represent departments attributed with a lower research output (see Table 6 .1, Section 6).
1 These rank groups are necessarily artificial. As in any other ranking, they overemphasize gradual differences between key figures.
However, the purpose of the rank groups is not to highlight actual differences in research performance but to serve as a proxy for the rank differences produced by the RAE/REF. In this way, the rank groups can be used as a starting point for an exploratory longitudinal analysis. The current study relates these rank groups to three different types of data, all of which are listed in the reports of the RAE/REF.
The contribution first investigates the composition of assessment panels (see Table 6 .2, Section 6.1).
Members can be nominated by professional associations, for example, by the British Society of Sports History, and by stakeholders from business and society, for example, by the British Museum of Natural
History. The four UK funding bodies assemble the panels on the basis of these nominations (RAE, 2001c; RAE, 2008b) . The panels for history consist exclusively of British historians. 2 Membership of an assessment panel indicates symbolic capital, defined as academic authority that makes it possible to consecrate research by determining legitimate problem definitions and problem solutions (Bourdieu, 1988) . Second, the contribution analyzes research staff in terms of full time equivalent (FTE) research positions at history departments (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2, Section 6.2). These are the staff nominated by departments to submit their publications for assessment. Research staff serve as a proxy for social capital, which is defined as the aggregate of resources that are linked to more or less institutionalized membership of a group (Bourdieu, 1986) . In this sense, the number of research staff indicates the resources available in a department for research proposals, reviews, or academic networks, for example. Third, external research funding indicates the allocation of economic resources to departments (see Figure 6 .3, Section 6.3). External grants can include, for example, funding from the research councils, 3 public and private funding, and funding from the European Union.
Research elites and the structurally unequal distribution of resources
Results from the three most recent RAE/REF show that, apart from isolated cases, there seems to be considerable consistency among the departments that are attributed with the strongest research output and 1 These categories are rank groups from the RAE/REF rankings. They are not the author's invention, and thus make no claim to sociological validity. 2 This is not only in contrast to a number of other panels that also include non-academic members. The decidedly national composition of the history panel also contrasts with the RAE/REF's emphasis of with international quality standards (see Figure 2 .1). 3 The UK dual support system combines the allocation of public funds by the funding councils (oriented on RAE/ REF results) and funding of specific projects by the research councils.
These are proofs of the final publication available at Springer International Publishing: http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319539690 8 those regarded as having the lowest research output (see Table 6 .1). From 2001 to 2014, three departments make it into the top 14 in all three assessments, and 10 more departments are included in the top 14 two out of three times. There is a similar stability at the bottom of the status hierarchy: while only one department is in the bottom 14 in all three assessments, nine more are in the bottom group two out of three times. Only one department moves from the bottom 14 into the top group, and not a single department is relegated from the top into the bottom rank group. (RAE, 2001a; RAE, 2001b; RAE, 2008b; RAE, 2008c; REF, 2014a; REF, 2014b ), author's presentation and calculation These are proofs of the final publication available at Springer International Publishing: http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319539690 9 A classical functionalist perspective might explain the high stability of status allocation with a stable allocation of "excellent" research among the elite positions of the hierarchy. The most relevant contributions to the state of research are valued highly and thus rewarded, while insignificant contributions are less visible and ultimately dispensable. In contrast to this -inevitably simplistic -sketch of functionalist perspectives, an analysis informed by Bourdieu's field and capital theory can explain the stable hierarchy with structurally unequal opportunities of capital accumulation that are consecrated by the respective rank groups. In the following, the unequal distribution of resources will be examined for symbolic capital in terms of panel membership (6.1), for social capital in terms of research active staff (6.2), and for economic capital in terms of external research grants (6.3). The analysis will examine how this distribution correlates to RAE/REF rank groups and is thus consecrated and (re-)produced.
Symbolic capital in terms of panel membership
The RAE/REF rank groups can be related to the composition of assessment panels. This gives insight, first, into the link between the performance of departments in the assessment and their simultaneous representation on the panels of the same assessment; and second, into the recruitment of panel members according to their rank group in the respective previous assessments (Table 6 .2).
These are proofs of the final publication available at Springer International Publishing: http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319539690 (RAE, 1996; RAE, 2001b; RAE, 2008b; REF, 2014a ), author's presentation and calculation departments that received grades higher than the average grade of all history departments in the respective assessment. In combination with the rank groups from Table 6 .1, the data illustrates that twelve, three, and five departments respectively were ranked among the top 14 in the previous assessments (PreT14). These are cases in which panel members were recruited from elite departments. Six, four, and eleven departments respectively were placed in the top 14 in the same assessment (CurT14). These are cases in which the departments of the panel members became elite. Hence, in the period investigated, there is a close relationship between the status elite of the field and the allocation of symbolic capital. The converse pattern can be found for the periphery: in all three assessments, not a single panel member was recruited from a department that was ranked in the bottom 14 in the previous assessment, and overall These are proofs of the final publication available at Springer International Publishing: http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319539690 11 only two departments fell into the bottom 14 despite being represented on the panel of the same assessment. In other words, in the period investigated, no department from the periphery is granted symbolic capital through panel membership, and cases in which departments with symbolic capital nevertheless fall into the periphery are extremely rare.
Social capital in terms of research active staff
The RAE/REF rank groups from Table 6 .1 can further be related to the distribution of research staff in the history field. Building on this, the data depicted in Figure 6 .2 illustrates how endowment with research staff changes after departments have been assigned to status groups. In other words, it demonstrates whether there is In any case, the movement of research staff as depicted in Figure 6 .2 shows that very good assessments are followed by an improved endowment with researchers, while less successful assessments do not by default imply an exodus of research staff. Unsuccessful performance can indeed lead to reduced funds and therefore cuts in research positions, although another reason for reduced staff endowment may equally be that departments are more selective about whose work is submitted to the next assessment. Nevertheless, low status assignments can also lead to heavy investment in research staff and a subsequent rise in research positions (cf. Elton, 2000 on strategic staffing in the wake of RAE/REF results). Nonetheless, a concentration of social capital in the center of the field is evident.
Economic capital in terms of external research grants
Relating rank groups to the external funding they attract reveals a close connection between research grants and status attributions (Figure 6.3) . This is to be expected, because departments submit their funding information to the RAE/REF for assessment, and since incoming funds are performance indicators, they directly influence the assessments. However, this means that the RAE/REF merely ennoble an established research elite that is already successfully attracting third-party funding, while the economic periphery can also expect worse overall grades in terms of research output. The RAE/REF thus attribute research performance to those departments that have attracted the most external funding in total and per research position. Crucially, the meritocratic explanation of a concentration of external funding also ignores the marginal utility a higher number of research staff has for attracting research grants. Personnel resources can be expected to contribute to the accumulation of economic resources. More research staff means that a department has more time for grant proposals, not least because the research staff have an overall lower teaching load. More research staff brings with it a larger network of colleagues, which in turn is advantageous for collaborations and reviews of proposals. Lastly, more research staff also leads to a higher visibility of departments in the field, again beneficial in a competitive research environment. In sum, research staff has a marginal utility for external research funds (cf. Münch, 2007 for similar effects in the German case). With the highly stratified distribution of research staff in mind (cf. Section 6.2), larger departments can be expected to have better chances with research proposals due to the marginal utility of their research staff. This interpretation would explain the concentration of economic resources in the top rank groups not in terms of meritocracy but as a self-reinforcing process that encourages the emergence of monopoly structures. Second, data on social capital in terms of research staff suggest that departments might follow different strategies in response to status allocations, namely, acquiring more or fewer research staff, or being more or less selective when nominating staff for the assessment. Low scores in the assessment can lead to development strategies in which departments invest in research staff in order to perform better in the following assessment. However, low scores can also lead to a reduction in the research staff of a department, or even its closure. What holds true either way is an unequal distribution of FTE research positions between elite departments and the periphery. The center-periphery structure in terms of social capital is aggravated over time.
Discussion: the consecration and (re-)production of research elites
Third, data on economic capital in terms of external grants illustrates that the elite departments were very successfully increasing their rate of external grants over time, while the periphery could not keep pace. The widening gap between the status groups is hardly surprising, as it is based on a self-fulfilling prophecy: successful acquisition of funds is already included as a performance indicator in the assessments and thus directly influences status allocation. Departments performing well in the assessments are further endowed with economic capital, and, completing the cycle, they can also be assumed to have advantages for future external funding. Hence the RAE/REF reproduce an economic center-periphery structure and consecrate the unequal distribution of external funds.
The many ways in which research elites are consecrated and (re-)produced have been revealed for the discipline of history. Current research suggests that the findings also apply to other disciplinary fields (cf. Lee et al., 2013 for economics) . Still, further research must address a variety of disciplinary cultures and how they relate to the effects of the assessments in different ways. In order to do this, a reasonable starting point seems to be to distinguish social sciences and humanities disciplines from other disciplines that have a culture of refereeing and linking quality to a hierarchy of journals, established rather uniform paradigms guiding incremental research, and a weaker link between teaching and research (Martin and Whitley, 2010) . Only then can a more systematic comparative perspective with other disciplines be developed.
The empirical evidence at hand could be explained by a functionalist perspective. In this view, scarce resources are allocated to the departments with the best research. Following this logic, departments that attract high amounts of funding, employ high numbers of research staff, and are represented on assessment panels are indeed part of a meritocratic research elite that needs to be protected under higher education governance. It is therefore only logical that the center-periphery structure revealed here is further developed and promoted by the assessments and the funding that accompanies them.
However, it is not by mistake that Merton (1968) , himself an advocate of the functionalist perspective, warned that a capitalization of research achievements would lead to the Matthew effect, according to which the probability of gaining reputation or resources increases exponentially with every previous gain in reputation or resources until these gains reach a point at which their marginal utility begins to diminish.
In this light, the evidence that departments already well endowed with economic resources receive further funds, that the gulf between research staff endowment of elite and peripheral departments is widening, and that there is an almost circular nomination of panel members and the top rank groups of their departments can be explained by the previous distribution of these resources. Research performance (alone)
does not seem to be the cause of this stratification. Another mechanism that, like the Matthew effect, intertwines the material and symbolic dimension of stratification provides further important insights. According to Weber's (1978) theory of social status, prestige hierarchies are reproduced when an elite adopts a distinctive style of life, and when there is no social intercourse between status groups. This mechanism of social closure explains persistent status differences between, on one side, peripheral departments that have few resources at their disposal and (have to) concentrate on teaching and, on the other, elite departments that exemplify a privileged academic lifestyle with sufficient grants and research staff, deciding on panels over the quality standards for the entire field. They enjoy the benefits of ample resources, including network effects in terms of social capital, marginal utility effects in terms of research equipment, and magnitude effects in terms of visibility in the field (Burris, 2004; Münch, 2008) .
The empirical evidence supports the claim that the RAE/REF not only consecrates reinforces the serious stratification in the field by producing rankings that reward those at the center of the field with an "elite" label. The assessments also (re-)produce research elites themselves because the distribution of basic research funding based on them follows previous allocations of resources. The production of research elites through stratification is inherently antithetical to the distribution of rewards on the basis of universalistic criteria of value or merit, as envisioned by functionalistic perspectives (Merton, 1973a 
